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Abstract 
The decision in New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council is the most 
recent legal development in the New Zealand debate about fluoridation of public water 
supplies. That decision centred on the interpretation of section 11 of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act, the right to refuse medical treatment. The Court held that the fluoridation in 
question was legal, and reached a limited definition of medical treatment that did not 
encompass fluoridation. This paper analyses the reasoning leading to that interpretation, 
concluding that the decision is problematic and that the definition of s 11 needs to be 
remedied. The use of the wording of s 11 to limit the definition of medical treatment was 
inappropriate, as was the policy reasoning used to support that limitation. The structure of 
reasoning followed exacerbated these issues and adhered too closely to the reasoning in 
United States cases. Furthermore, the application of a de minimis threshold was conducted 
without adequate scrutiny, and such a threshold should not be applied to s 11.  
Key words: New Zealand Bill of Rights, fluoridation, right to refuse medical treatment, New 
Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council. 
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I Introduction 
In Texas and Colorado in the 1900s, a peculiar phenomenon of stained teeth became 
noticeable and was referred to as both “Texas Teeth” and “Colorado Brown Stain”.1 
Investigations soon revealed that the stained teeth, while unsightly, were also more resistant 
to dental caries.2 Further analysis revealed that the cause of both the resistance and the 
staining was fluoride, and the benefits of fluoride were soon acknowledged by public health 
authorities and fluoride was added to public water supplies.3 Fluoride has since become a 
common additive to water supplies worldwide.4 Despite this, its presence is controversial 
and has incited opposition and spawned numerous legal challenges.5 As of yet, these 
challenges have not been successful.6 
A different weapon in the arsenal of anti-fluoride campaigners in New Zealand has recently 
been tested: section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (BORA), the right to refuse 
medical treatment. The first attempt to contest fluoridation on the basis of this right occurred 
in 2013, in New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council (New Health).7 
This case note intends to analyse the part of that decision regarding the interpretation of s 
11, and limitation of medical treatment.  
The definition of s 11 that was formulated in New Health is particularly important, as it is 
key to the controversy surrounding fluoride. This paper posits that the reasoning in New 
Health is flawed, and led to the incorrect conclusion that fluoridation is not medical 
treatment for the purposes of s 11. It is possible that this may be remedied by a future court,8 
and that fluoridation could constitute a prima facie breach of s 11. This would in turn mean 
that the section 5 analysis, as to whether a breach of a right is reasonably and demonstrably 
justified,9 would receive greater focus.  Such an analysis would better accommodate 
                                                            
1 Eugene Garfield “Fluoridation, ‘Texas Teeth’, and the Great Conspiracy” (1986) 9 Essays of An Information 
Scientist 3 at 3. 
2 Jill Wrapson “Artificial Fluoridation of Public Water Supplies in New Zealand: Magic Bullet, Rat Poison, or 
Communist Plot?” (2005) 7 Health and History 17 at 19.  
3 At 19. 
4 Robert E Clark and Michael M Sophy “Fluoridation: The Courts and Opposition” (1967) 13 Wanye Law Rev 
338 at 338. 
5 At 342. 
6 At 375. 
7 New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council [2014] NZHC 395. 
8 See New Zealand Herald “Fight to Remove Fluoride Taken to the Court of Appeal” (26 March 2014) 
<www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
9 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
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discussion of new research developments in this area, 10 meaning that those developments 
could have a greater impact on the legality of fluoridation. 
Thus far, there has been a lack of current and reliable research undertaken in regard to the 
safety of fluoridation. The most comprehensive recent report is the York Review on Water 
Fluoridation (2000),11 which was itself critical of the amount of evidence available about 
fluoridation.12 Closer to home, the Royal Society of New Zealand has undertaken a review 
of the available scientific research on the safety and efficacy of fluoride.13 The report 
concluded that community water fluoridation provides dental benefits, and does not pose a 
risk to public health.14 Nevertheless, new scientific developments may emerge and change 
the nature of this debate. The role of future research will depend very much on whether the 
reasoning in New Health is followed in subsequent cases, or whether its flaws are recognised 
and corrected. It is thus imperative to explore the interpretation of New Health and to 
highlight the defects of the decision, as the definition of s 11 remains central to the legal 
landscape surrounding the fluoridation debate.  
This paper intends to establish that a combination of erroneous reasoning led to the incorrect 
conclusion that fluoridation does not constitute medical treatment. Initially, the paper will 
provide a background of fluoridation and the debate surrounding it. The paper then 
summarises the reasoning and result in New Health. It should be noted the scope of this 
paper is limited and will not involve an extensive discussion of the issues in the case that are 
not connected with s 11, as the scope of s 11 is the issue most in need of rectification. 
Part IV analyses three main points of the reasoning in New Health. First, the wording of s 
11 was improperly interpreted and does not require a limitation of medical treatment. 
Second, the policy analysis used to support a limited definition of s 11 is out of place at the 
                                                            
10 See Part IV B 4. 
11 Matthew Bradley and others A Systematic Review of Public Water Fluoridation (NHS Centre for Reviews 
and Dissemination, Report 18, September 2000); and ET Treasure and others “The York Review – A 
Systematic Review of Public Water Fluoridation: A Commentary” (2002) 192 British Dental Journal 495 at 
495. For information on the most recent New Zealand study of fluoridation, see University of Otago 
“Fluoridating Water Does Not Lower IQ: Otago Research” (19 May 2014) <www.otago.ac.nz>.  
12 Treasure and others, above n 11, at 497. For another recent scientific discussion of fluoride, see Phillip 
Grandjean and Phillip Landrigan “Neurobehavioural effects of developmental toxicity” (2014) 13 The Lancet 
Neurology 330. 
13 Office of the Prime Minister’s Chief Science Advisor and the Royal Society of New Zealand Health 
Effects of Water Fluoridation: a Review of the Scientific Evidence (August 2014). 
14 At 56. 
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definitional stage of reasoning and should instead have been left to a s 5 analysis; a limitation 
is not in accordance with the purpose of s 11. This policy reasoning is based on misplaced 
concerns about the ability of an individual to veto a public health measure, leading to a 
definition with problematic ramifications. The paper will assert that a preferable approach 
would involve a wide interpretation of medical treatment which would include fluoridation. 
The third main issue of reasoning is that the application of the de minimis approach is skirted 
over too briefly in New Health, and analysis reveals that it should not have been applied to 
s 11. 
Overall, this paper endeavours to elucidate the shortcomings of the interpretation of s 11 in 
New Health, and to suggest a more desirable approach. 
II  Fluoridation 
Currently, around 50 percent of New Zealanders drink fluoridated water,15 a practice which 
the Ministry of Health refers to as a “safe, effective and affordable way to prevent and reduce 
tooth decay across the whole population.”16 While common, fluoridation remains 
controversial. The growing opposition to fluoridation in New Zealand has included 
campaigns from groups such as the Fluoride Action Network New Zealand and New Health 
New Zealand Incorporated (New Health). These groups challenge the effectiveness of, and 
highlight alleged dangers of, fluoridation.17 One accepted side effect of fluoridation is 
fluorosis (an aesthetic “defect of the tooth enamel”),18 but less commonly discussed side 
effects are also alleged, such as arthritis and even heart disease.19 
 
Overseas, similar opposition is apparent, due to the fact that fluoridation is closely linked to 
widely held ideas, such as fear of toxic chemicals and distrust of governmental intrusions 
into personal freedoms.20 This opposition has led to legal challenges,21 focusing on whether 
                                                            
15 Ministry of Health “Fluoride” (20 September 2013) <www.health.govt.nz>. 
16 Ministry of Health “Fluoridation” (5 February 2014) <www.health.govt.nz>. 
17 See Fluoride Action Network NZ Inc “Fluoride Free New Zealand” <http://fluoridefree.org.nz>; and New 
Health NZ “News” <www.newhealth.co.nz>. 
18 Ministry of Health “Fluoride and Health” (30 August 2011) <www.health.govt.nz>.  
19 Fluoride Action Network NZ Inc “Fluoridation and Heart Disease” and “FAQ” <http://fluoridefree.org.nz>.   
20 Brian W Head “The Fluoridation Controversy in Victoria: Public Policy and Group Politics (1978) 37 
AJPA 257 at 258. 
21 See for example Millership v British Columbia [2003] BCSC 82; Dowell v City of Tulsa 273 P 2d 859 (1954); 
and Kraus v City of Cleveland 127 NE 2s 779 (1995). 
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certain bodies have the power to fluoridate, and also on arguments attacking fluoridation as 
breaching particular rights.22 Different legal frameworks overseas mean these challenges 
have often relied on broadly stated rights, such as s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms which protects liberty and security of the person.23 Such challenges have thus far 
been largely unsuccessful.24 
 
The lack of successful litigation overseas has likely been a deterrent to similar action in New 
Zealand. Another deterrent may have been a New Zealand Human Rights Commission 
report in 1980, which concluded that fluoridation was not a denial of human rights.25  
Nevertheless, another option has now been tested. Enacted in 1990, s 11 of BORA provides 
a right to refuse medical treatment. The right is unique as it is particularly specific and has 
no direct international equivalent.26 Section 11 therefore allows a slightly different type of 
challenge in comparison to those undertaken overseas. The decision in New Health involved 
the first discussion in a court about the legality of fluoridation in relation to s 11. 
III  The Decision in New Health 
In 2012, the South Taranaki District Council (the Council) made the decision to fluoridate 
the water supplies of Patea and Wavereley, in South Taranaki. This decision was challenged 
by New Health, by way of judicial review.27 
 
Section 11 of BORA was central to the arguments and decision in New Health. Section 11 
states that “everyone has the right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment”,28 and is part 
of a group of rights which “recognise the right to dignity and security of the person”.29 The 
right has been interpreted broadly, and held to cover instances such as psychological testing 
                                                            
22 Clark and Sophy, above n 4 at, 342. 
23 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7. See also the European Convention on Human Rights, art 8; 
the Florida Constitution, art 1 s 23; the United States Constitution, amendment 14; and the Irish Constitution 
Act, art 40.3. 
24 Clark and Sophy, above n 4, at 375. 
25 New Zealand Human Rights Commission Report on Representations on Fluoridation of Water Supplies 
(1980).  
26 Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2003) at 
252.  
27 See New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council, above n 7, at [2]. 
28 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 11. 
29 See New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, ss 8, 9, 10, 11. See also A Butler and P Butler The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act: A Commentary (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2005) at 11.6.1. 
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with a therapeutic purpose, and a medical examination of children relating to their health 
and safety.30 As anticipated by the White Paper,31 the majority of issues that have arisen thus 
far in relation to s 11 have regarded the nature of consent required by the section.32 In 
contrast, New Health focused on the interpretation of medical treatment. 
 
While New Health did challenge the Council’s power to fluoridate,33 this argument was not 
successful as the High Court held that the Council had a “clear legislative mandate” to add 
fluoride to drinking water supplies.34 The bulk of the case involved discussion of the legality 
of fluoridation in relation to BORA, with New Health alleging that the fluoridation of public 
water supplies was a breach of s 11 that was not prescribed by law and that was an unjustified 
and disproportionate limit on s 11.35 Hansen J’s reasoning in this area will be elaborated on 
below, but his Honour concluded that fluoridation is not medical treatment and therefore 
does not fall within the scope of s 11.36 New Health also raised a number of arguments about 
the Council’s decision making process, arguing that the Council failed to take into account 
a series of mandatory relevant considerations.37 However, the majority of these 
considerations related to the alleged breach of BORA, 38 and these arguments were therefore 
not successful. Overall, this cause of action also failed.39 
 
New Health was unsuccessful in regard to each argument raised. Their applications for 
declarations regarding the decision being both ultra vires and in breach of BORA, and a 
further application for an order quashing the decision, all failed.40 
                                                            
30 See M v Attorney General [2006] NZFLR 181; and Smith v Attorney General HC Wellington CIV-2005-
485-1785, 9 July 2008 at [100]. 
31 Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper” [1984-1985] I AJHR A6 at 109.  
32 Butler and Butler, above n 29, at 11.9. See for example, Re E [1993] 1 FLR 386; and Re S [1992] 1 NZLR 
363 (HC). 
33 New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council, above n 7, at [2]. 
34 At [37]. 
35 At [2]. 
36 At [90]. 
37 At [2]. 
38 At [112]. 
39 At [114]. 
40 At [13] and [121]. 
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IV  Analysis of the Interpretation of Section 11 in New Health 
Certain aspects of the above reasoning require a more detailed analysis. This Part will 
undertake an analysis of the way that the wording of s 11 was used to limit the section, the 
policy considerations used to support that limitation, and, the application of a de minimis 
approach.  
 
A The Wording of Section 11 
When using the wording of s 11 to determine the scope of medical treatment, Hansen J 
acknowledged that the purpose of an intervention is relevant to whether it is medical 
treatment.41 In order for something to be medical treatment, it must have a therapeutic 
purpose.42 Hansen J concluded that fluoridation clearly has a therapeutic objective as it is “a 
process undertaken for the purpose of preventing or arresting a disease”: dental caries.43 
Despite this, his Honour held that the wording of s 11 meant something more than just a 
therapeutic purpose was required, and that s 11 can only apply to the treatment of an 
individual, as opposed to treatment administered to groups.44  This conclusion was reached 
after Hansen J found that “the terms of s 11 themselves indicate that medical treatment is of 
a more limited scope”.45 Section 11 protects a right to refuse to “undergo” medical treatment 
without consent, and Hansen J asserted that the word ‘undergoing’ cannot be applied 
comfortably to the process of drinking fluoridated water and, further, that fluoridation is 
more likely to be described as something that is ‘done’ to a patient.46  
 
Hansen J also compared the wording in s 11 with that in ss 9 and 10 of BORA,47 which 
protect rights not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment and not to be subjected to 
either medical or scientific experimentation respectively.48 His Honour concluded that the 
                                                            
41 At [55]. 
42 At [55] and [57]. See also Butler and Butler, above n 29, at 11.8.5. To compare with the Australian and 
European approaches see Douglas Cross “Water Fluoridation as Mass Medication” (7 April 2013) 
<www.xproexperts.co.uk> at 3. 
43 At [58] and [79]. 
44 At [84]. 
45 At [82]. 
46 At [82]. 
47 At [83]. 
48 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 9 and 10. 
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inclusion of “subject to” in ss 9 and 10 means that those rights cover a broader range of 
activities, while s 11 has a narrower scope due to the use of “undergo”.49 
This reasoning led Hansen J to the preliminary conclusion that “the right to refuse medical 
treatment is only engaged when the treatment takes place in the context of a therapeutic 
relationship in which medical services are provided to an individual.”50  
 
The Court was wrong to reach this conclusion, as the wording of s 11 does not clearly require 
a limitation. Firstly, the difference in wording between ss 9 and 10, and s 11, may be due to 
the divergent nature of these rights. Torture and scientific or medical experimentation are 
quite different concepts to medical treatment, and it is logical that the verbs used in regard 
to them are different to those used in relation to medical treatment.  The Oxford Dictionary 
defines ‘subject’ as: “… to cause or force someone or something to undergo … a particular 
experience or form of treatment, typically an unwelcome or unpleasant one”.51 This 
emphasises that ‘subject to’ is likely to be used in regard to especially negative situations. 
The concepts in ss 9 and 10 have more obviously negative connotations than s 11, supported 
by the fact that s 10 is based on art 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),52 which  protects people from torture and cruel treatment and was “a 
response to the atrocities of Nazi concentration camps”.53  
 
Secondly, the difference in wording may also be due to the way the activities relevant to the 
different rights would be conducted. Sections 9 and 10 use “subject to”, envisaging activities 
that would be forced upon people. The use of “undergo” in s 11 is a more appropriate word 
for s 11, which is intended to apply to treatment that is optionally undertaken. Medical 
treatment with consent, envisaged by s 11, is benign and is not likely to be something people 
are ‘subjected to’.  
 
These alternate explanations reach the opposite conclusion to Hansen J, indicating that ss 9 
and 10 may in fact be of a narrower scope than s 11. 
                                                            
49 At [83]. 
50 At [84]. 
51 Oxford Dictionaries “Subject” <www.oxforddictionaries.com>. 
52 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), art 7. See Butler and Butler, above n 29, at 11.4.2. 
53 Manfred Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd ed NP Engel 
Publishing, Kehl, 2005) at 188.  
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Another available counter argument to the Court’s reasoning is that if Parliament only 
wanted this right to apply to treatment of an individual, a limitation could have been 
expressed in the wording of the section. The absence of such wording implies that rights can 
be applied both to conduct towards individuals, and to conduct applied to groups. Further, 
neither s 10 of BORA nor art 7 of the ICCPR specify that they are intended to apply to 
groups of people, but this is clearly the case, considering the history of the sections,54 as a 
number of Nazi concentration camps conducted experiments involving treatment being 
administered to groups of people simultaneously.55 Logically it should be presumed that the 
right in s 10 applies to similar situations, rather than just to treatment and experimentation 
administered to individuals. Therefore, the fact that a right does not specifically state that it 
covers administration of treatment to a group of individuals does not necessarily mean such 
an application would be outside the ambit of the right’s protection.  
 
The wording of s 11 does not, on its own, stipulate that the scope of medical treatment should 
be limited to direct treatment of individuals.  
 
B Policy Reasoning in New Health 
Hansen J concluded that the policy implications relevant to limiting the scope of medical 
treatment supported a restrictive reading of s 11.56 This reasoning is flawed as it 
overestimates the ability of individuals to veto public health measures. Further, Hansen J 
mimics the approach of United States authorities, resulting in a structure of reasoning that 
is not appropriate in the New Zealand context and that does not adequately reflect the 
purpose of s 11. These factors lead to a definition that has problematic implications.  
 
A pivotal point in this section of reasoning was that s 11 should be limited to the direct 
treatment of an individual, as “within that sphere there are no competing interests that need 
to be moderated or resolved.”57 Hansen J argued that the right should not be engaged where 
                                                            
54 See Butler and Butler, above n 29, at 11.4.2. 
55 Telford Taylor “Opening Statement of the Prosecution, December 9, 1946” in George J Annas and Michael 
A Grodin (eds) The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremburg Code; Human Rights in Human Experimentation (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1992) at 75, 77, and 83. 
56 New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council, above n 7, at [86]-[90]. 
57 At [86]. 
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the state employs public health interventions, because “were it otherwise, the individual’s 
right to refuse would become the individual’s right to decide outcomes for others.”58 In sum, 
Hansen J considered that s 11 should be limited to direct treatment of an individual, as if 
that were not the case, an individual proving a breach of s 11 in relation to a public health 
measure could stop implementation of that measure. The Court concluded that s 11 is not 
engaged where the state employs public health interventions,59 and that therefore 
fluoridation is not medical treatment.60 
 
Hansen J’s policy concerns are overstated, as many public health measures will not lead to 
the possibility of a breach of s 11 and will not give an individual the chance to veto a public 
health measure. In order to breach s 11, the public health measure must be of a nature that 
is not practical to refuse.61 Regarding fluoridation, Hansen J logically concluded that an 
individual would not have the practical ability to refuse fluoridated water,62 as they could 
not reasonably avoid something in their water supply.63 Following that reasoning in New 
Health, anything included in a public water supply is likely to meet the threshold of being 
impractical to refuse,64 as is any legislative scheme providing for compulsory treatment.65 
However, the pervasiveness of fluoridation can be linked to the fact that extensive measures 
must be used to combat dental caries, as it is such a widespread issue.66 Many public health 
measures will not be so extensive and will not be impractical to refuse.  
For example, Hansen J asserted that the addition of folic acid to bread is comparable to 
fluoridation, and that as a public health measure it would not constitute medical treatment.67 
This is not an appropriate comparison, as the current use of folic acid in New Zealand is an 
example of a public health measure that can easily be avoided. Folic acid is added to some 
                                                            
58 At [86]. 
59 At [86]. 
60 At [91]. 
61 At [91]. 
62 At [94]. 
63 At [94]. 
64 At [80] and [94]. 
65 For an example of such a scheme, see Jacobson v Commonwealth of Massachusetts 197 US 11, 25 S Ct 
358 (1905). 
66Abel Wolman, JC Geiger and WC Morse “Should Public Water Supplies be used for Mass Medication” 
(1947) 39 American Water Works Association 834 at 863. See also GA Strong “Liberty, Religion and 
Fluoridation” (1967) 8 Santa Clara Lawyer 37 at 44. 
67 At [81]. 
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types of bread,68 to reduce the risk of neural tube defects in babies.69 While the Ministry for 
Primary Industries has set guidelines about the amounts to be added, addition of folic acid 
is voluntary and it is not added to all types of bread.70 Therefore, those who do not wish to 
consume additional folic acid can easily avoid doing so. This measure is unlikely to cause a 
breach of s 11, and is not on par with fluoridation as it does not raise the possibility of an 
individual being able to veto a public health measure. Along with other public health 
measures, such as free influenza vaccinations for people in certain age and health brackets,71 
the fortification of bread with folic acid can be practically avoided. These examples do not 
support Hansen J’s finding that all public health measures should be excluded from s 11, as 
an individual would have no power to veto their implementation.  
Another flaw of the policy reasoning in New Health is that it implicitly assumes that, if 
fluoridation or another public health measure were to be considered medical treatment, the 
implementation of such a measure would be an unjustifiable breach of the right to refuse 
medical treatment. Hansen J neglects to outline that a breach of s 11 could be justifiable 
under s 5, which states that BORA rights “may be subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.72 
Section 5 means that BORA rights can be subject to reasonable limits. If fluoridation was 
held to be a reasonable limit on s 11, an individual would not be able to prevent or stop it, 
as s 5 would prevent them from establishing a breach. The failure to explain this further 
undermines the reasoning in this section.  
 
1 Structural Issues 
Hansen J’s use of policy concerns to limit the definition of s 11 is also problematic, as those 
concerns should instead have been discussed under a s 5 analysis.  
 
The structure Hansen J follows is reminiscent of the approach taken in the United States 
cases relating to this issue.73 In some instances, examination of relevant policy concerns can 
                                                            
68 For a list of fortified breads (as at 2011) see Ministry for Primary “Folic Acid Fortified Breads” (2011) 
<www.foodsmart.govt.nz>. 
69 Ministry of Health “Folate/Folic Acid” (October 2013) <www.health.govt.nz>. 
70 Ministry for Primary Industries “Fortification of Bread with Folic Acid Q&A” (October 2012) 
<www.foodsafety.govt.nz>. 
71 National Influenza Specialist Group “Can I get a Free Flu Vaccine” <www.fightflu.co.nz>. 
72 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5.  
73 See for example – the US cases that I think use definitional balancing 
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lead to the limitation of the definition of a right. For example, in a United States case, Kraus 
v City of Cleveland,74 a case about the legality of fluoridation, a definitional limitation was 
read in to the fundamental liberties protected by the United States Constitution. Justice 
Matthias considered policy implications, and limited the right because:75  
 
The liberty secured by the constitution of the United States to every person within 
its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person … There are 
manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common 
good.  
 
This approach is referred to as definitional balancing, “meaning that matters of evaluation 
are built into a definition of the right concerned.”76 Definitional balancing is applied in the 
United States, and is also apparent in New Health, when Hansen J uses policy considerations 
to determine the scope of s 11. As outlined, one such consideration in New Health focused 
on what would allow the greatest good for the greatest number.77 This argument is apparent 
in United States cases involving human rights related challenges to the legality of public 
health measures.78 For example, in Dowell v City of Tulsa, the fact that a right to refuse 
fluoridation would not be in the interests of the community as a whole meant that the 
challenge to the legality of fluoridation failed.79 In Jacobson v Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, Justice Harlan stated that if a man were able to refuse a compulsory smallpox 
vaccination, “the spectacle would be presented of the welfare and safety of an entire 
population being subordinated to the notions of a single individual”.80 Hansen J does not 
specifically reference Jacobson in the context of his policy considerations, but is clearly 
following a very similar line of reasoning when he indicates concern about the possibility of 
an individual being able to veto public health measures.  
 
                                                            
74 Kraus v City of Cleveland, above n 21. 
75 At 801. 
76 Rishworth and others, above n 26, at 53.  
77 At [86]. 
78 See for example Dowell v City of Tulsa, above n 21, Minnesota State Board of Health v City of Brainerd 
241 NW 2d 624 (1976) at 632, and Jacobson v Commonwealth of Massachusetts, above n 65 at 336. 
79 Dowell v City of Tulsa, above n 21, at 863. See also Minnesota State Board of Health v City of Brainerd, 
above n 78 at 632. 
80 Jacobson v Commonwealth of Massachusetts, above n 65, at 336. 
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The Court should not have adhered to the United States approaches, as the New Zealand 
courts have only applied definitional balancing in restricted circumstances.81 In Re J, the 
Court of Appeal held that, in an instance where BORA rights conflicted,82 definitional 
balancing was appropriate to ensure the effective compatibility of the rights in question. 
However, even this narrow use of definitional balancing has been controversial.83  
 
The presence of s 5, a limitation clause, means that definitional balancing should not 
automatically be applied in New Zealand. To reiterate, s 5 means that a measure can legally 
limit a right, if the measure is prescribed by law and reasonably and demonstrably justified.84 
In contrast, the United States has no limitation clause, meaning that courts must read in 
limitations at the definitional stage by assessing all relevant policy arguments.85  For 
example, the point Hansen J relies on from Dowell is about the fact that the protection of 
liberty does not require “immunity from reasonable regulations imposed in the interests of 
the community”.86 This focus on reasonableness in Dowell is an example of the American 
Court performing something close to a s 5 analysis when defining the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which is much more broadly phrased than s 11.87 This is further evidence that 
this type of discussion could be completed at a further stage of the BORA analysis, and that 
Hansen J is following the United States approach too closely. In some circumstances,88 it is 
appropriate to read in a limit when a right is defined, but not unless this is in accordance 
with the purpose of the relevant right. The presence of s 5 creates a unique New Zealand 
framework and means it cannot be assumed that limitations at a definitional stage are 
appropriate.  
 
2 The New Zealand Framework 
In R v B, when comparing the New Zealand and United States rights protection frameworks, 
Richardson J noted that: 89 
                                                            
81 See Re J (An Infant): B and B v Director-General of Social Welfare [1996] 2 NZLR 134 (CA). 
82 At 146.  
83 Rishworth and others, above n 26 at 55; and Butler and Butler, above n 29 at 6.6.17. 
84 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s5. 
85 Butler and Butler, above n 29, at 6.6.2. 
86 Dowell v City of Tulsa, above n 21, at 863, emphasis added. See New Health New Zealand Inc v South 
Taranaki District Council, above n 7, at 76. 
87 United States Constitution, amendment 14. 
88 See Part IV B 2.  
89 R v B [1995] 2 NZLR 172 (CA) at 183. 
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… The American Bill of Rights does not contain a limitation clause and, since 
rights cannot be absolute, the American courts have had to imply qualifications 
on absolute rights … In New Zealand s 5 is the statutorily mandated test … It 
requires the New Zealand courts to develop their own pattern of reasoning in a 
case such as the present. 
 
The presence of the limitation clause in BORA means limitation should be less likely to 
occur when a right is defined. Instead, considerations of policy and reasonableness can be 
relevant to whether a limit is reasonably and demonstrably justified under s 5. Andrew and 
Petra Butler outline an approach called ‘ad hoc balancing’ which relies on s 5 and is in stark 
contrast with definitional balancing, as it requires rights to be broadly defined and all 
questions as to limitations and reasonableness to be left to the s 5 analysis.90  
 
The two extreme ends of the spectrum, definitional balancing and ad hoc balancing, involve 
either all or no policy considerations to be discussed when the right is defined. However, as 
Paul Rishworth states, “the line between defining rights and considering justified limitations 
on them is not so easy to draw”.91 In reality there are more nuanced approaches available 
and the appropriateness of a limitation depends on the particular nature of the right and what 
it is intended to protect. For example, some rights may contain definitional issues that require 
resolution at an early stage of interpretation,92 or, rights like the right against double jeopardy 
may seem so absolute that any discussion of s 5 (and possible limitations on the right) would 
be inappropriate.93  
There are two main instances in which the nature of a right may lead to limits being read in 
to its definition.94 Firstly, the right may contain an internal qualifier – a word that by its 
nature requires definition.95A second and more complex instance is when “considerations of 
purpose may lead to the conclusion that certain conduct properly falls outside the scope of 
                                                            
90 Butler and Butler, above n 29, at 6.6.1.  
91 Paul Rishworth “How to Interpret and Apply the Bill of Rights” (paper presented to the New Zealand Law 
Society The Bill of Rights – Getting the Basics Right Seminar, November 2001) at 12.  
92 At 14.  
93 At 14. See also the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 26. 
94 Rishworth and others, above n 26, at 52. 
95 At 52. 
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a right and is not protected at all”.96 This may be because the conduct is beneficial in some 
way, or because consideration of the right’s purpose demonstrates that certain conduct falls 
outside its scope.97  
Another relevant consideration is that interpreting rights broadly can lead to situations which 
may be either beneficial for society or quite trivial, needing to be justified pursuant to s 5. 
This places a costly burden,98 usually on the Crown,99 which has to prove both that the action 
is prescribed by law and that it is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Of 
course, the need for protection of rights means that this alone is not enough reason to 
conclude that all rights should be limited. However, it does mean the purpose of a right 
should be considered carefully in relation to the facts of a particular case, and that a right 
should be limited if a wide interpretation would lead to trivial or overwhelmingly beneficial 
actions needing to be justified under s 5. 
Overall, BORA interpretation should follow a purposive approach, which involves 
identifying the purpose of the right and using that to determine its scope. This can indicate 
whether or not a right should be limited at an early stage of reasoning. As noted by 
Rishworth,100 the New Zealand courts have endorsed the purposive approach,101 and are 
likely to follow something similar to this Canadian approach:102  
 
The meaning of a right or freedom … [must] be understood … in the light of the 
interests it was meant to protect. … The interpretation should be a generous rather 
than a legalistic one … [but, at] the same time, it is important not to overshoot 
the actual purpose of the right or freedom in question. 
3 Section 11 
Section 11 does not contain an internal qualifier, as it contains no word that by its nature 
requires evaluation. A more pertinent issue is that of whether public health measures do or 
                                                            
96 Rishworth, above n 91, at 12. 
97 For an example, see the debate around the right to be free from discrimination: Rishworth and others, above 
n 26, at 375-376; and Butler and Butler, above n 29, at 17.9.8. 
98 Sir Ivor Richardson “Rights Jurisprudence – Justice for All?” in Phillip A Joseph (ed) Essays on the 
Constitution (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) at 81. 
99 Rishworth and others, above n 26, at 174. 
100 Rishworth, above n 91, at 10. 
101 Rishworth and others, above n26, at 43. See also Minister of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA)  
per Cooke P at 268-9, Richardson J at 277 and Hardie Boys J at 286. 
102 R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 344. See also Butler and Butler, above n 29, at 4.2.1. 
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should fall outside the ambit of s 11. Hansen J concluded that public health measures should 
fall outside s 11, leading to the ruling that fluoridation does not constitute a breach of s 11.103 
However, examination of the purpose of s 11 reveals that the scope of the right should not 
have been limited. 
Rishworth describes rights as “labels for entitlements that we regard as generated by a set 
of reasons that are sufficient to justify placing other persons under a duty to respect that 
right”.104 In order to understand the entitlement created by s 11, the justifying reasons behind 
the right must be considered. 
The BORA White Paper indicates that s 11 was intended to give independence in regard to 
medical decision making, and in doing so to:105 
Permit persons to be treated against their will only where this is necessary to 
protect the health and safety of other persons, and not simply where their refusal 
of treatment will detrimentally affect their own health. 
Section 11 thus protects a right to bodily autonomy, an individual’s ability to have control 
over their body and to be able to choose what goes in to it or what is done to it. The right is 
a reflection of the importance placed on informed consent to medical treatment in New 
Zealand, a focus unique to the New Zealand setting.106 This emphasis has been influenced 
by the Cartwright Inquiry 1988, which found that a cervical cancer study had been conducted 
without the knowledge of the subjects.107 This revelation caused public outcry, due to the 
“lack of respect for a person’s right to be informed about what other people do to their 
body”.108 The inquiry caused legal change,109 and attitudinal change in the form of a 
heightened awareness of the importance of informed consent.110 
                                                            
103 New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council, above n 7, at [86]. 
104 Rishworth, above n 91, at 8. 
105 Palmer, above n 31, at 109. 
106 The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v All Means All [2014] NZHC 1433 at [46]. See 
also Butler and Butler, above n 29, at 11.2.3. 
107 Butler and Butler, above n 29, at 11.2.3. 
108 At 11.2.3. 
109 Joanna Manning and Ron Paterson “New Zealand’s Code of Patients’ Rights” in Joanna Manning (ed) 
The Cartwright Papers: Essays on the Cervical Cancer Inquiry 1987-88 (Bridget Williams Books Ltd, 
Wellington, 2009) 150 at 151 and 160. 
110 Sandra Coney “Unfinished Business: The Cartwright Report Five Years On” in S Coney (ed) Unfinished 
Business, What Happened to the Cartwright Report? (Women’s Health Action, Auckland, 1993) 45 at 48.  
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The importance of control over one’s body is also exemplified by the fact that there needs 
to be no particular reason behind refusal of treatment. An ability to refuse is itself sufficient, 
and is what society values. Therefore, as emphasised by Rishworth, “religious based refusals 
need no special privilege because competent adults may refuse for any reason”.111 Section 
11 and broader overseas provisions enable an individual to determine and prioritise any 
considerations which they may regard as more important than the preservation of their own 
health.112 Further, s 11 is able to be exercised in regard to treatments of varying degrees of 
seriousness. As stated by Potter J in M v Attorney General:113 
 
A right to determine what shall be done with one’s own body can be seen as 
important in relation to a medical examination or assessment as in respect of an 
anaesthetic, a surgical operation, or the administration of medicine. 
 
The intentions expressed in the White Paper have been realised in New Zealand case law. 
In R v B, Richardson J stated that “On any view freedom from invasion of physical privacy 
and bodily integrity is a fundamental human right.”114 In doing so, his Honour confirmed 
that s 11 protects bodily integrity, and identified that s 11 is an encapsulation of a value that 
runs throughout New Zealand law.115 A similar discussion arose in KR v MR, when Miller J 
acknowledged that bodily integrity is protected by both s 11 and by the Code of Health and 
Disability Services Consumers’ Rights.116 
The unique New Zealand context has produced a narrowly stated right which intends to 
protect individual autonomy in regard to medical decisions. Fluoridation is in conflict with 
this purpose, and should therefore be included within the scope of medical treatment.  
 
In New Health, the Court neglected to identify the conflict between fluoridation and the 
purpose of s 11. Instead, Hansen J found that fluoridation did not constitute medical 
                                                            
111 Rishworth and others, above n 26, at 260. 
112 Elizabeth Wicks “The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment under the European Convention on Human 
Rights” (2001) 9 Med Law Rev 17 at 17. 
113 M v Attorney General, above n 30, at [107]. 
114 R v B, above n 89, at 182. 
115 At 182. 
116 KR v MR  [2004] 2 NZLR 847 (HC) at [74]. 
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treatment, a finding largely based on concerns about the potential right of an individual to 
veto public health measures like fluoridation.117  
Public health measures which are impractical to refuse (like fluoridation) are so clearly at 
odds with s 11 that it is logical, if not imperative, for the state to have to justify their 
implementation. An inability to refuse such measures takes away an element of dignity from 
citizens and limits their bodily integrity by preventing them from exercising choice in regard 
to their bodies. The clash between these measures and the purpose of s 11 means that such 
measures should not be excluded from the scope of s 11. Instead, they should have to be 
justified under s 5 in order to be legal. As mentioned, the White Paper indicated that s 11 is 
intended to “permit persons to be treated against their will only where this is necessary to 
protect the health and safety of other persons”.118 A s 5 analysis would require justification 
of public health measures and would evaluate their validity and necessity, meaning that only 
reasonable measures could infringe on s 11. 
The fact that s 11 is a narrowly stated right lends further support to requiring s 5 justification 
for fluoridation and similar public health measures. Broadly framed rights, like freedom of 
expression, are more likely to require limits as their already wide scope creates a higher 
chance for trivial issues to lead to prima facie breaches, or for activities which are clearly 
outside the scope of the purpose to be covered by the broad wording of the right.119 The 
narrowness of s 11 means that its purpose is particularly clear; it protects a specific right 
relating to bodily autonomy, rather than a broad right to liberty. Such a specific intention 
should not be ignored or limited without good reason. 
4 A Preferable Approach 
A preferable approach would be for s 11 to be interpreted broadly to include any medical 
treatment that has a therapeutic purpose.120 If this were the case, fluoridation would be a 
prima facie breach of the right and would have to be justified under s 5.  
                                                            
117 New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council, above n 7, at [87]. 
118 Palmer, above n 31, at 109. For a similar approach in an international context, see Douglas W Cross and 
Robert J Carton “Fluoridation: A Violation of Medical Ethics and Human Rights” (2003) 9 Int J Occup 
Environ Health 24 at 25. 
119 Rishworth, above n 91, at 13.  
120 See Butler and Butler, above n 29, at 11.8.5. 
A Decay of Rights: The Decision in New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council 
 
21 
 
The stages of reasoning likely to be followed when conducting a s 5 analysis are those set 
out by Tipping J in Hansen v R:121 
  
(a) Does the limiting measure serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify 
curtailment of the right or freedom?  
(b) (i) is the limiting measure rationally connected with its purpose? 
(ii) does the limiting measure impair the right or freedom no more than is 
reasonably necessary for sufficient achievement of its purpose? 
 (iii) is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective 
 
These steps were followed by Hansen J in New Health. His Honour concluded that if 
fluoridation did engage the s 11 right, fluoridation is prescribed by law and would be a 
demonstrably justified breach of s 11 pursuant to s 5 of BORA.122 However, this discussion 
was brief and not decisive, as Hansen J had already concluded that fluoridation is not 
medical treatment.  
 
A s 5 analysis should encompass policy considerations like those discussed by Hansen J 
regarding the scope of medical treatment. For example, the need to limit an individual’s 
ability to veto a measure that is beneficial for others would be relevant, as that would relate 
to whether the limiting measure impairs the right or freedom no more than is reasonably 
necessary for sufficient achievement of its purpose. It could be argued that fluoridation 
would be a reasonable limitation on the right of a small number of individuals who wished 
to refuse to the treatment, because of the overall benefit that it would provide for the 
community.  
 
While this approach would lead to discussion of the same policy concerns raised in New 
Health, it is preferable because it is more likely to give effect to the purpose of BORA, 
which is to protect individuals from abuse of power by the state and to “provide a minimum 
set of standards to which public decision making must conform.”123 Limiting the scope of 
rights means that rights are less likely to be engaged, and that the s 5 analysis is therefore 
                                                            
121 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 58, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [104], per Elias CJ at [42], per Blanchard J at [64], per 
McGrath J at [203], and per Anderson J at [272].  See also New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki 
District Council, above n 7, at [101].  
122 New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council, above n 7, at [96]. 
123 Palmer, above n 31, at 5. 
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also less likely to be engaged. In the case of public health measures, it seems logical that the 
state should be required to prove, on the balance of probabilities,124 the reasonableness and 
proportionality of a measure, rather than public health measures being excluded from the 
scope of s 11. If a measure could not be justified under s 5, citizens would then be able to 
assert their s 11 right to stop it from being implemented. This approach would add to the 
beneficial creation of what Andrew Butler, crediting late South African scholar Etienne 
Mureinik refers to as a culture of justification.125 In such a culture, “citizens are entitled to 
call upon the provision of reasons for measures that affect their rights” and, “are entitled to 
expect that in advance of impairment thought will have been given to the reasonableness of 
a particular limit”.126 If public health measures do not have to be justified, there is less of an 
incentive for the state to investigate their reasonableness, and no option for citizens to 
question that reasonableness or the necessity of the measure under BORA.  
 
A possible counter to above arguments is the fact that the courts have already read in a limit 
on the s 11 right, as only those who are competent to understand the nature of the medical 
treatment relevant to them can make decisions regarding refusal and consent.127 However, 
that limitation is acceptable as the need to read in a limit on the word “everyone” in s 11 was 
clear and in accordance with the purpose of the section. This limit was specifically 
anticipated in the White Paper, 128 and before s 11 was enacted, a body of law already existed 
about who could refuse or give consent to treatment.129 This makes it more likely that such 
a limit was expected. Further, the medical law that s 11 is closely connected to focuses on 
the ability to give informed consent.130 Consent is only valued when a person has the 
capacity to understand the nature of the treatment relevant to them, and to make a decision 
based on that understanding.131 This was reinforced in Smith v Attorney General, where it 
was acknowledged that informed consent is the type of consent relevant to this type of 
                                                            
124 See Rishworth and others, above n 26, at 174. 
125 Andrew S Butler “Limiting Rights” (2003) 33 VUWLR 33 537 at 554. 
126 At 554. 
127 Butler and Butler, above n 29, at 11.9.9. See for example Re E, above n 32. See also on this, Graeme Austin 
“Righting a Child’s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment: Section 11 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and 
the Gillick Competent Child” (1992) 7 Otago L Rev 578. 
128 Palmer, above n 31, at 109. 
129 At 109. 
130 P D G Skegg “Consent” in (eds) P D G Skegg and Ron Paterson Medical Law in New Zealand (Brookers, 
Wellington, 2006) at 146. 
131 See on this P D G Skegg “Capacity for Consent to Treatment” in Medical Law in New Zealand, above n 
130 at 171.  
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right,132 as it is the type of consent valued by society. A limit on “everyone” is therefore not 
in conflict with the purpose of s 11 which intends to protect refusal by those who can give 
informed consent. In contrast, the limit that Hansen J read into medical treatment is not in 
line with the purpose of s 11 and is not obviously justified by any other reason. In order to 
best protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, limitations should only be read into rights 
when clearly necessary. 
 
5 Problems with the Definition Reached 
The scope of s 11 was outlined as follows: 133 
 
Medical treatment is confined to direct interference with the body or state 
of mind of an individual and does not extend to public health interventions 
delivered to the inhabitants of a particular locality or the population at 
large. 
 
There are two main parts to this definition. The first, the idea that medical treatment requires 
direct interference, supports the second part of the definition, the conclusion that medical 
treatment does not cover public health interventions. This result and the narrowed scope of 
s 11 have the potential to lead to problematic consequences which are not in accordance 
with the purpose of s 11. 
 
A hypothetical scenario illustrates the shortcomings of this definition. If, in response to the 
outbreak of a disease, antibiotics were introduced to the water supply of South Auckland, 
individuals would not be able make a challenge via s 11.  As a public health measure, this 
would not be ‘medical treatment’, even though it would involve the exact same components 
as something ordinarily thought of as medical treatment. This type of measure would also 
be in clear conflict with the purposes of s 11, as it would ignore the bodily autonomy of 
citizens and restrict their decision making power in regard to medical treatment. Further, the 
state would not be required to justify the public health measure under s 5, meaning that 
citizens would have no guarantee that the measure was proportionate and reasonable. This 
                                                            
132 Smith v Attorney General, above n 30, at [102]. 
133 New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council, above n 7, at [118]. 
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seems absurd, given that such a measure would lead to a large scale violation of what s 11 
is trying to protect. 
The same can be said for an issue raised in New Health’s submissions, about whether 
medication could be introduced to the water of a prison.134 According to the definition from 
New Health, this action would be unchallengeable under s 11 as it would be treatment 
administered to a group, rather than confined to interference with the body or state of mind 
of an individual. The fact that large scale violations of the purposes of s 11 are not covered 
by the definition of the right seems backward, as surely those measures are most in need of 
justification.  
While these hypotheticals show the concerning potential of the definition from New Health, 
they also emphasise the validity of the preferred approach outlined above,135 as that approach 
would require the state to justify the above public health measures and to prove their 
reasonableness. 
The decision from New Health gives too much power to the state in relation to public health 
measures, as could permit the implementation of invasive public health measures that are 
not challengeable under s 11 of BORA. 
C De Minimis  
Another concerning aspect of the decision in New Health is the way that the de minimis 
concept, or enquiry as to materiality, is brushed over. De minimis comes from the Latin 
phrase “de minimis non curat lex” which translates to mean “the law does not deal with 
trivial things”.136 A court may invoke this approach in order to avoid addressing trivial 
breaches of law. For example, in Minnesota State Board of Health v City of Brainerd, Justice 
MacLaughlin concluded that “while forced fluoridation does intrude on an individual’s 
decision whether or not to ingest fluoride, the impact of this intrusion on an individual’s life 
is negligible.”137 
 
This concept was not thoroughly addressed in New Health. Hansen J concluded that if 
fluoridation were to be medical treatment, an individual would not be able to practically 
                                                            
134 Plaintiff’s Submissions for Hearing on 25 November 2013 before Rodney Hansen J at [154]. 
135 See Part IV B 4. 
136 A&C Black Dictionary of Law (5th ed, A&C Black Publishers Ltd, London, 2007) at 79.  
137 Minnesota State Board of Health v City of Brainerd, above n 78, at 632. 
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refuse it. His Honour then went on to state that even if this were the case, “the intrusion into 
an individual’s right would be minimal”.138 This section of reasoning is somewhat 
ambiguous, as Hansen J does not label his approach as de minimis, although he does imply 
that fluoridation would constitute a minimal breach of s 11. His Honour acknowledges that 
the “enquiry into materiality is for the purposes of determining whether the right is engaged 
in the first place”,139 indicating that a de minimis threshold is being applied to determine 
whether or not s 11 is engaged. This brief discussion is inadequate, as the role of the de 
minimis approach in a BORA context is not straightforward. 
 
1 The State of the Law 
While the de minimis approach has been discussed in relation to the BORA rights of persons 
arrested or detained (s 23),140 and freedom from discrimination (s 19),141 it is not well 
established that the de minimis enquiry is a requisite part of the BORA analysis. 142 
Conversely, the Canadian courts have stated that the Charter does not protect trivial breaches 
of rights.143 An application of the de minimis concept can be seen in the Canadian case of 
Millership v British Colombia where it was concluded that fluoridation was a minimal 
intrusion into Mr Millership’s right to liberty and security of the person and therefore did 
not constitute a prima facie breach of that right.144 The right at issue in Millership was a very 
broad one,145 and the application of a de minimis threshold may be a tool the Canadian 
system uses to limit such broad rights. The same approach is not necessarily applicable to 
the much narrower right protected by s 11. 
 
In Police v Smith and Herewini, which involved application of s 23 to the taking of blood 
from a drink driving subject pursuant to the Transport Act 1962,146 materiality of breach was 
considered important. This was discussed specifically when defining detention.147 
                                                            
138 New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council, above n 7, at [95]. 
139 At [95]. 
140 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 23. 
141 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 19. 
142 Police v Smith and Herewini [1994] 2 NZLR 306 (CA); Ministry of Health v Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184, 
[2012] 3NZLR 456; and Child Poverty Action Group Incorporated (CPAG) v Attorney General [2013] NZCA 
402.  
143 Millership v British Colombia, above n 21, at [103]. See also R v Jones 1986 SCC 569.  
144 Millership v British Colombia, above n 21, at [112].  
145 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7. 
146 Police v Smith and Herewini, above n 142, at 319. 
147 At 316. 
A Decay of Rights: The Decision in New Health New Zealand Inc v South Taranaki District Council 
 
26 
 
Richardson J stated that “… it will be important to consider the nature, purpose, extent and 
duration of the constraint.”148 It was concluded that “something more than a temporary 
check, hindrance or intrusion on the citizen’s liberty is required”.149 However, Police v 
Herewini is not authority for the fact that an inquiry into materiality is a requisite part of 
BORA analysis, as the discussion in that case was limited to s 23. 
 
A more complex examination of this topic has been carried out by the courts in regard to the 
right to be free from discrimination, culminating in the decision in MoH v Atkinson.150 In 
Atkinson, Ellen France J concluded that the appropriate test for discrimination should be 
whether different treatment “imposes a material disadvantage on the person or group 
differentiated against”.151 This is an apt approach to apply to s 19, as while the purpose of 
the right is to prevent differential treatment,152 treating people differently is often benign or 
even beneficial, and is something governments do regularly.153 It is therefore unlikely that 
the right is intended cover all types of differential treatment, making it appropriate to apply 
a de minimis threshold. However, this reasoning cannot be universally applied to all BORA 
rights, as the particular nature of the right in question must be taken into account. 
 
2 Relevance of De Minimis to Section 11 
The applicability of the de minimis approach to s 11 should have been better scrutinised in 
New Health. The submissions for New Health included more detail on this issue, with the 
submissions on behalf of the Attorney General stating: 154 
  
Section 11 also invites the application of a de minimis threshold … If the addition 
of a therapeutic or preventative compound to water were to constitute medical 
treatment, the effect on the individual must be more than trivial or transient 
before it could give rise in any meaningful sense to a right to refuse it.  
 
                                                            
148 At 316. 
149 At 316. 
150 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 142. 
151 Ministry of Health v Atkinson, above n 142, at [109], emphasis added.  
152 Butler and Butler, above n 29 , at 17.4.1. 
153 Rishworth and others, above n 26, at 375. 
154 Counsel for the Attorney General’s Submissions on Intervention, at [91]. 
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The Council submitted that “If the Court were to consider fluoridation is a medical treatment 
which cannot be refused, it is submitted that fluoridation of water is nevertheless a trivial 
breach of that right”,155 an approach which most closely resembles that taken by Hansen J.  
 
In contrast, New Health submitted: 156 
 
There is no such thing as a trivial or de minimis breach of the right simply because 
the treatment could be considered relatively minor.  
 
In order to determine whether a de minimis threshold should be applied to s 11, it is 
appropriate to revisit the purpose of the right. As already outlined, the purpose of s 11 is not 
only to protect physical integrity, but also to prevent decision making autonomy.157 
Applying a de minimis threshold is not in accordance with those purposes. As New Health 
submitted, this would mean the right would not be engaged if someone was forced to take 
paracetamol.158 While the physical impacts of that are likely to be minor, it would be an 
action taken with disregard to the autonomy of that person and would negatively impact 
their bodily integrity.  Application of a de minimis threshold would not acknowledge that it 
is the ability to refuse treatment, rather than the reasons behind refusal, that is important.159 
Such a threshold would be in direct conflict with the purposes of s 11, as it would restrict 
the element of choice that the right intends to provide and only allow recourse in relation to 
treatments of a certain level of seriousness.160 
 
This issue may be further elaborated on by the courts, as application of a de minimis 
threshold is likely to be especially relevant if future research into fluoride demonstrates that 
those who consume fluoridated water are negatively impacted. The above analysis evinces 
that the application of a de minimis threshold to s 11 would disregard the core purposes of 
the right. 
                                                            
155 Submissions on behalf of South Taranaki District Council, at [155]. 
156 Plaintiff’s Submissions for Hearing on 25 November 2013 before Rodney Hansen J at [161]. 
157 Butler and Butler, above n 29, at 11.6.1. See also Palmer, above n 31, at 109. 
158 Plaintiff’s Submissions for Hearing on 25 November 2013 before Rodney Hansen J at [161]. 
159 See Part IV B 3.  
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V Conclusion 
The decision in New Health has resulted in a definition of s 11 of BORA that gives the state 
greater leeway to infringe on the rights of New Zealanders, without having to justify its 
actions.  
The definition reached was limited in a way that is not required by the wording of s 11, and 
the policy reasoning used to support that definition was flawed. While a desire to allow 
beneficial public health measures to continue is understandable, the measure taken in New 
Health in response to that desire was misguided. A major hindrance to the reasoning in New 
Health is the structure that Hansen J followed, as it too closely resembles the reasoning in 
the United States cases and thus takes a stance which is out of place in the New Zealand 
context. This structure led to a definition that is at odds with the purpose of s 11, and which 
may allow the bodily integrity of groups of individuals to be violated. Further, the de 
minimis concept was not given enough attention and should not be applied to s 11.  
A preferable outcome would involve a definition of s 11 that included public health 
measures, like fluoridation. It can only be hoped that the interpretation of s 11 in New Health 
will be rectified, when the decision comes before the Court of Appeal. 161 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
161 New Zealand Herald “Fight to Remove Fluoride Taken to the Court of Appeal” (26 March 2014) 
<www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
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